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During the review period the South Carolina Supreme
Court dealt with three cases involving divorce, two cases
involving custody and one separate maintenance suit, each
of which is reviewed herein.
Cleveland v. Cleveland' involved an appeal in a divorce
action brought by the husband wherein the wife sought sep-
arate maintenance and support for herself and the children.
No divorce was sought by the wife, the husband also asked
for custody of the children.
The action was brought in the County Court for Spartan-
burg County and was referred to the master who concluded
that the husband was entitled to a divorce on the grounds
of desertion; that having left a suitable home without just
cause, the wife was not entitled to support and that the
wife should be given custody of the children during school
months with the right to the husband to visit them in Cali-
fornia, where she was living; and that the husband should
have the right to have the children visit him in Spartanburg,
South Carolina, when the children were not in school.
The master further recommended that the husband should
be required to support the children in a stated amount and
to pay the wife's attorneys fees.
On exceptions to the master's report the County Court
sustained the finding that the husband was entitled to a
divorce on the grounds of desertion and that the wife was
mot entitled to separate maintenance and support, modifying
the master's report by increasing the amount allowed for the
support of the children and increasing the amount of the
attorney's fees for the wife, and by further directing that the
question of visitation should be left open to enable the
parties to work out a mutually satisfactory agreement, fail-
ing in which the visitation rights would be subsequently fixed
by the court.
"A member of the firm of Gaines and Vermont, Spartanburg and Inman,
South Carolina.
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The wife appealed contending the testimony failed to
establish desertion for the necessary period before the com-
mencement of the action; that she should be granted a decree
of separate maintenance and support; that the amount fixed
for the support of the children and attorney's fees is inade-
quate and that visitation rights of the husband should -be
fixed. The record shows that there were three children of
the marriage and that in October, 1957, after some differences,
both having received psychiatric treatment, the parties signed
an agreement that whereas the mother was to take the chil-
dren for an extended visit to the home of her mother in
California, which visit should not extend beyond September
1 , 1958, the parties agreed that no action for the custody of
the children would be brought in any state other than the
State of South Carolina unless mutually agreed upon.
. In December, 1957, the husband went to California to visit
the family, joining them on a week's cruise to Mexico, during
vhich time the parties cohabited.
In February, 1958, the wife brought an action for separate
maintenance and support and the instant action was com-
menced exactly one year and one day after the wife left the
South Carolina home of the parties, alleging desertion for
a period of one year and seeking divorce.
Holding that the burden was on the plaintiff-respondent to
show that the desertion continued uninterrupted for a period
of one year prior to the action, the court, pointed out the
essential elements of.desertion as: 1. Cessation from cohabita-
tion. 2. Intent on the part of the absent party not to resume it.
3. Absence of the opposite party's consent, and 4. Absence of
justification.
I'It is uniformly held that separation of the parties by mutual
consent does not constitute a desertion, although such separa-
tion may be revoked at any time by either party making a
bona' fide request for a resumption of the marital relations,
which if refused without justification or excuse, furnishes
the revoking party sufficient cause for a divorce on the
grounds of desertion by the party refusing to resume the
cohabitation.
The statutory period commences to run from the date of
the refusal to resume relations.
[Vol. 15
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The Court held that the agreement of October 4, 1957, con-
stituted separation by mutual consent, and that the evidence
showed that only after the trip did the wife conclude that
there was no hope of reconciliation.
The Court did not pass on the question of whether or not
there was a refusal to resume the marital relations without
excuse on the part of the wife, since the request was made
within the statutory one year period necessary for desertion
and a refusal could not have established grounds for divorce
for the statutory period of one year.
Holding that the complaint should have been dismissed
on this sole ground and that it was error to find that the
wife deserted without just cause or excuse since the written
-consent shows a separation by mutual agreement, the Court
reversed and remanded for a determination by the court
below whether or not the wife was justified in returning
to him in the separate maintenance suit, pointing out it would
then be proper to determine the right to such separate main-
tenance and support as well as support for the -children, at-
torney's fees and the question of visitation by the husband.
Ford v. For/2 concerned the construction of a "dismissed
agreed" order of a Virginia court and its effect in this State
on a custody proc.eeding brought by the wife in the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court of Greenville County,
Under the agreement the husband was given custody of
the children with the right of the wife to have custody .dur-
ing the summer vacation time and for certain holiday periods.
In the instant action-the judge of the court below issued an
order awarding custody of the children to the wife, with rea-
sonable visitation. to.the husband as might be agreed upon
by. the parties.
On appeal• the Common Pleas Court modified the custody
provision somewhat and made some changes as to visitation,
refusing to hold as res judiata the custody agreement and
refusing to give full faith and credit to the agreed dismissal
order of the Virginia court.
On appeal the Court held that the dismissed agreed order
of the court of Virginia constituted a judgment on the merits
barring subsequent action from the same cause, and was
equivalent to a judgment of retraxit and was res judicata in
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the state where rendered and accordingly was entitled to fulL
faith and credit.
Further holding that a judicial award of custody of chil-
dren is never final, the Court found an absence of allegation
or proof of a change of circumstances requiring a change of'
custody of the children subsequent to the dismissed agreed
order by the Virginia court which was still in full force and.
effect.
Mr. Justice Oxner dissented pointing out that the merits.
of the present controversy were never considered or passed
upon in Virginia and that the agreement made between the-
parties was never exhibited to the Court. He further pointed
out that such an order is apparently binding on the parties.
in Virginia because the courts cannot change the contract
of the parties without their consent, but did not agree with!
the soundness of this principle when applied to an ordinary
civil action. Pointing out that the rights of custody of chil-.
dren is not a mere property to be contracted away between
parents, he felt the question was open to judicial inquiry-
as to whether or not such agreement was for the best interest
of the children who were lawfully in the State of South
Carolina.
In Piana v. Pianal the husband in December of 1959, had
brought a divorce action on the grounds of adultery, in the.
Civil Court of Florence County, against the wife, seeking an
equitable settlement of the ownership of certain property-
alleged to have been owned in common by himself and hi&
wife, and asked that he be declared the owner of the home-
in which the couple resided, allegedly purchased with his7
money and title wrongfully taken by his wife in her own name.
The wife, denying the charge of adultery, sought a divorce-
on the grounds of desertion in the nature of a cross-action,
seeking custody of the children and that the husband be,
required to support them.
She alleged half ownership in certain property and the-
sole ownership of others, claiming it was purchased with her
funds.
The court below, after the hearing, filed an order September
9, 1960, finding the proof insufficient to establish adultery-
and that the wife had deserted the husband without cause
3. 239 S. C. 367, 123 S. E. 2d 297 (1960).
[Vol. I&
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in September, 1959, and by reason of such desertion was
not entitled to separate support, accordingly neither party
was granted a divorce.
The court awarded custody of the two minor daughters
to the mother and custody of the minor son to the father,
with visitation privileges to each parent. The court held
that both parcels of real estate, including furniture, fixtures
and furnishings were acquired as a joint venture and should
be equally divided between the parties, with the right of
either to demand a partition if an agreeable division cannot
be arranged. A notice of intention to appeal was filed but
was subsequently dismissed.
Shortly after the filing of the order of September 9,
1960, a new action was instituted in the Civil Court of Florence
by the husband, on the grounds of desertion, which by this
time had continued for the statutory period of one year.
The wife defaulted and the divorce was granted December
13, 1960.
This action was brought in the Common Pleas Court of
Florence County seeking to vacate and set aside the prior
decision of the Civil Court of Florence on the grounds that
court was without jurisdiction to make an adjudication of the
property rights. From an order refusing such motion this
appeal is taken. The appellant contends that having refused
to grant a divorce to either party, the court was without
jurisdiction to make an adjudication of the property rights,
and that in any event the court was without jurisdiction be-
cause the value of the property involved, conceded to be in
excess of $11,000.00, was above the jurisdiction of the Civil
Court of Florence County.
4
The Court on appeal held that Section 15-16095 contem-
plates that in divorce proceedings the jurisdiction of the
Civil Court of Florence shall be co-extensive with that of
4. The jurisdiction of the Civil Court of Florence County in ordinary
civil actions is limited to cases "in which the amount claimed" does not
exceed the sum of $11,000.00. CODE OF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 15-1608
(1952). However, with reference to divorce proceedings it is provided,
"Said civil court shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the court of
common pleas of said county in actions relating to divorce from the bonds
of matrimony and in the matter of alimony and property rights, regardless
of the amount involved, connected with such divorce actions, if one of the
parties to the divorce action shall have been a resident of said county
within the jurisdiction territory of said court for six months." CODE OF
LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA 15-1609 (1952).
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the Court of Common Pleas and the jurisdictional limitation
of Section 15-16086 does not apply. The Court agreed with
the judge of the Court of Common Pleas below that it had
no jurisdiction in a collateral attack to impeach the validity
of the prior adjudication of the property rights of the parties
by the Civil Court of Florence.
The Court held that its first inquiry was whether the
court below had the jurisdiction initially to entertain the
action brought by the husband, for the general rule is that
jurisdiction of a court depends upon the state of affairs
existing at the time it is invoked. If jurisdiction once at-
taches to the person and subject matter of the litigation,
the subsequent happening of events will not ordinarily op-
erate to oust the jurisdiction already attached.
The Court distinguished between'jurisdiction and the ex-
ercise of jurisdiction, holding that the authority to decide
a cause at all and not the decision rendered therein, is
what makes up jurisdiction, pointing out the difference be-
tween the want of jurisdiction in which the court has no
power to adjudicate at all, and a mistake in the exercise of
undoubted jurisdiction, in which the action of a trial court
is not void, although it may be subject to direct attack on
appeal.
Appellant's position was that the civil court only had juris-
diction to decide property matters- when a divorce was
granted, and that failing to grant the divorce its jurisdiction
failed on the question of settlement of property rights. Dis-
tinguishing the South Carolina law- from the -law in other
jurisdictions, the court relied *on Machado v. Machadob7 1and
Clevelazd v. Cleveland8 herein reviewed, where although
divorce was denied in the action, it was held that the court
had jurisdiction to determine the question of separate main-
tenance and support. The Court further held that in some of
the decisions cited the reasoning that the parties may become
reconciled and resume cohabitation had no application to the
instant ease because the husband had procured a divorce
before the wife instituted this proceeding. Further, that
this view goes merely to the exercise of jurisdiction and
not to the jurisdiction of the court.
6. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLiNA, (1952).
7. 220 S. C. 90, 66 S. E. 2d 629 (1951).
8. 238 S. C. 547, 121 S. E. 2d 98.
[Vol. 15
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The Court further pointed out that in the divorce case the
wife previously asked the court to make a proper division
or settlement of the properties owned by the parties, and
that the greater weight of authority is to the effect that the
voluntary litigation in the divorce cause by the parties of
their respective property rights, confers jurisdiction on
the court to determine the question raised thereby, regard-
less of whether the court otherwise would have had juris-
diction.
Pointing out that while the divorce statute9 does not ex-
pressly authorize the court in a divorce proceeding to settle
disputed claims of the parties to real and personal property,
yet such an action is within the equity jurisdiction of the
court,'0 and the Court found nothing in the divorce statute
undertaking to restrict the broad powers of the Court of
Chancery. The court having general jurisdiction when a
divorce action is brought, such jurisdiction is not lost when
the divorce is denied. Assuming that in such a divorce pro-
ceeding, particularly when a divorce is denied, the court should
refrain from undertaking any adjudication of property rights,
the question is not one of jurisdiction, but the proper exercise
of jurisdiction, and the remedy for any mistake is by direct
appeal, not collateral attack.
In the original proceeding complained of here, both parties
had sought an adjudication of the property rights. While not
declaring an estoppel in haec verba the implication is clear
from the opinion that the parties are now estopped from deny-
ing the jurisdiction of the court.
In Brown v. Brown"I the Court reviewed a judgment of the
Common Pleas Court of Horry County dismissing the com-
plaint of a wife in a petition for a divorce a mensa et thoro,
wherein the wife was granted support and maintenance pen-
dente lite, but suffered a dismissal of her petition on the
merits. On appeal the Court reviewed the facts and found
ample evidence to support the finding of the Common Pleas
Court that the wife by inviting arguments and pursuing them
diligently and vigorously was substantially at fault in provok-
ing the difficulties upon which she based her action. The
Court further held that although a wife need not be wholly
9. CODE OF LAWS OF SOUTH CAROLINA Title 20, Chapter 2 (1952).
10. CODE oF LAws OF SOUTH CAROLINA § 20-105 (1952).
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blameless in order to recover in an action for divorce a
mensa et thoro based upon her charges of physical cruelty
and other conduct of her husband, rendering it impossible
for her to continue to live with him, if the wife is chargeable
with substantial fault or misconduct materially contributing
to disruption of the marital relations or inducing an action
by the husband upon which she relies to justify the separation,
she is not entitled to separate maintenance.
Dobson v. Dobson.32 The parents of the child whose custody
was involved in this case were divorced in 1956. Custody of
the child had previously been before the court.1
3
There, when the divorce decree of May 11, 1956, was
granted, the mother was given custody of the child with
visitation privileges to the father. The mother remarried and
announced an intention to take the child to the island of
Taiwan where the step father was stationed with the armed
services. The father sought to prevent the mother from
taking the child out of the country. The mother's right to
the custody was sustained by the opinion of the standing
master, the lower court and the Supreme Court.
When the mother and her second husband, Dr. Julian E.
Atkinson, returned to South Carolina about September of
1958, the mother, threatened with a miscarriage, was hos-
pitalized and subsequently on January 17, 1959, that child
was born dead. For several months prior to the latter date
the mother was unable to leave her home to participate in
custody proceedings concerning visitation privileges of the
father. On November 4, 1958, the judge of the Richland
County Court issued an ex parte order directing the Sheriff
to take the child, a little girl, into his custody and award
temporary custody to the father during the pendency of the
petition. In November, 1958, the mother petitioned the court
to modify the November 4th order. On November 20, 1958,
the mother appeared by counsel, being unable personally
to attend. The next day the county court modified the order
of November 4th to allow weekend visitation privileges to
the mother, continuing that order in effect until the mother
was able to appear personally.
12. 238 S. C. 521 121 S. E. 2d 4 (1961).
13. Dobson v. Atkinson, 232 S.-C. 12, 100 S. E. 2d 531 (1957).
[Vol. 15
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On April 1st, 1959, an informal conference was held in
which the county court declined to modify its order of No-
vember 4th, rendering no formal order.'4
On October 8, 1959, the mother petitioned the court that
custody of the child be confirmed to her in accordance with
the decrees of the county court of May 11, 1956, and March
19, 1957. The matter was referred to the master who found
that the mother, having fully recovered from her illness,
and being able to take care of the child, should have the
custody and the father should have the right to visitation.
Upon exceptions the county judge reversed the master,
ordered custody of the child to be with the father pending
further order of court, modifying somewhat the visitorial
privileges previously granted to the father.
The Court on appeal held that the orders of November 4,
1958, and November 21, 1958, and January 22, 1958, were
merely temporary in nature and did not attempt to fix per-
manent custody.
The Court agreed that the master and the trial judge had
properly held that the maternal grandparents of the child had
done a good job of caring for her while she was temporarily
in the custody of the father, that the decision was wise to
leave the child there during the period of the mother's illness,
holding that a custody decision is never final and reviewing
the well known standards for awarding custody. The Court
upon disagreement between the master and the county judge
was free to determine the question according to its own view
of the evidence.
Finding that both parents were of good reputation, and
giving weight to the recommendation of the master, who had
had an opportunity to observe the witnesses, the Court found
that it was in the best interest of the child that she be left
with her mother, since the father was away a good bit of
the time at work and with other interests, the child being a
girl of tender years, the matter can be reviewed in the
future under change of circumstances. The father was gran-
ted reasonable rights of visitation.
14. Cf. Long v. McMillin, 226 S. C. 598, 86 S. E. 2d 477 (1955), where a
patrolman was orally instructed by a judge to retain a pistol pending an
order of the court and it was held that an unrecorded oral instruction of the
judge was not "order of court" and Commissioner of the State Highway
Department and the captain were not in contempt for demoting and trans-
ferring the patrolman and his superior for not turning a pistol over to the
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The case of Collins v. Collins,15 involves a third appeal by a
husband unwilling to assume his proper familial responsi-
bilities, and willing to go to any lengths to avoid the power of
the court to enforce the rights of the wife and child.
The case was on appeal previously on a nonsupport con-
viction of the husband, State v. Collins,"' and on a question of
venue Collins v. Collins.17 The battle continued in the instant
case on two separate appeals from a circuit decree made
February 2, 1961, which (1) adjudicated on its merits a
divorce proceeding between the plaintiff wife and defendant
husband and, (2) ordered that in the event of his defaulting
in a payment directed by the decree to be made to or for
the benefit of the plaintiff and the child or to her attorneys
as their fee, such payments should be made by trustees from
an alleged living trust agreement executed in 1942 by the
father of the defendant husband for his benefit.
The appellant husband sought a reversal on the grounds
(1) that the evidence was insufficient to support the holding of
physical cruelty and constructive desertion; (2) the amounts
awarded for support of the wife and child and for an at-
torney's fee are respectively excessive and, (3) the decree re-
quired the husband to pay medical and hospital bills incident
to the birth and care and in that connection to reimburse the
plaintiff's mother for expenditures made by her for such
purpose.
The trustees appealed on grounds hereafter discussed. Find-
ing that the evidence fully warranted the trial judges con-
clusion that the physical acts of violence visited upon the
wife by the husband constituted such physical cruelty as to
endanger her health and afford sufficient grounds to support
a divorce decree in the wife's favor, the Court found that
while the husband was a college student and had only part
time employment, there was a family trust set up for his
benefit and it was proper to require him to pay $200.00 per
month to be equally divided between mother and child for
alimony and support. Holding it error to require that the
payments be increased January 1, 1962, immediately upon
the husband's graduation from college, as subsidizing in spec-
ulation, the Court left the question open as to whether or
not the amount should be increased at that time.
15. 239 S. C. 170, 122 S. E. 2d 1 (1961).
16. 235 S. C. 65, 110 S. E. 2d 270 (1959).
17. 237 S. C. 230, 116 S. E. 2d 839 (1960).
[Vol. 15
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The trial court taking in to consideration the wife's finan-
cial inability to pay her attorney's fees fixed the fee for
services at $3,000.00 for litigation which includes: 1. An
action for divorce in the juvenile and domestic relations and
special court of Kershaw County, dismissed for lack of juris-
diction. 2. A second action in that court in which defendant
unsuccessfully attacked jurisdiction and thereafter served
notice of intention to appeal. 3. Criminal prosecution of the
defendant for non support, State v. Collims, supra, in which
respondent's counsel collaberated with the solicitor both on
trial and in the appeal. 4. An action for divorce in the court
of common pleas for Horry County terminated by a consent
order setting aside the attempted service of the summons and
complaint, and 5. His services in this case.
The Court reduced the fee to $1,500.00 holding that it was
an error to consider any litigation other than the instant case
in fixing the services of counsel.
The Court pointed out that whether or not in the divorce
proceeding the husband's financial status is a factor to be
considered by the court in assessing fees for wife's counsel
is a question that has been variously discussed in other
jurisdictions and to which the Court would not attempt a
categorical answer though it would seem to the court that
the husband's wealth or poverty is a matter bearing not so
much upon the value of such services as upon the collectibility
of the award therefor. The Court pointed out the usual
standards for fixing a fee and the fact that the husband may
be unable to pay it affords no basis for denying such judgment.
The decree under appeal ordered the husband to pay all
bills incurred and paid by the wife or her mother on be-
half of the wife and child for the hospitalization, medical
care and medicine incident to the birth of the child and
for its care up to the date of the decree. The husband
complained on appeal that no such relief was asked in the
complaint; that his mother-in-law was not a party to the
action, and that the evidence showed it was impossible for
the appellant to make such payment.
Finding that the husband was not misled as to the proof
of expenditures in question, since evidence of them was ad-
mitted without objection on his part and witnesses were
cross examined without reservation concerning them, and
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not a party to the action, since the abandonment of the wife
and child by the husband cast upon the wife and her mother
the necessity of paying and incuring such obligations, the
Court held that the husband should only be protected against
having to pay any such obligation more than once. The case
was remanded to the trial court to the end that after reason-
able notice to appellant through his counsel, to respondent
and her mother, the amount of such obligation and by whom
each was incurred or paid might be determined either upon
direct hearing or after reference and holding that at such
hearing or reference, the wife's mother may present a claim
for reimbursement as she may be advised and upon so doing
should be bound by the judgment of court thereabout; further
that as to such sums paid by the wife, she should have
judgment, holding for the benefit of the mother any portions
thereof representing payments by the mother.
The Court reviewed the irrevocable inter vivos trust. One
of the trustees, a South Carolina resident, was personally
served. A copy was sent by mail to the other trustee who
was a resident of North Carolina. The South Carolina trustee
demurred and the North Carolina trustee appearing specially,
moved to quash the attempted service as ineffectual to confer
jurisdiction. The court below, holding that it had jurisdiction
over the trust estate and that the demurrer must be over-
ruled, did not expressly pass on the motion to quash and
after granting the divorce and making provision for alimony,
,support and counsel fees as hereinabove discussed, ordered
that in the event of default by the defendant husband of
any of the payments so directed to be made by him, the
trustees should make such payment out of the income or
corpus of the trust estate.
On appeal the Court held that the trustee should have been
allowed to answer after his demurrer was overruled and that
it was error not to accord him that right, further that it
was error not to afford the North Carolina trustee the op-
portunity to appear generally or answer or plead or contest
upon the merits. Aside from these considerations the Court
held that the wife's attempt to obtain relief at the hands
of the trustee was futile and that the motion to quash by the
North Carolina trustee should have been granted since the
action was not in rem against the trust assets and manifestly
could not be sustained as such because they were not within
[Vol. 15
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the court's jurisdiction, so that such trustee was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court except through service of the sum-
mons upon him within the jurisdiction or by a general ap-
pearance, neither of which took place.
The trust provides that after the defendant husband be-
comes 21 years of age the trustee had the sole discretion to
pay to him or apply for his benefit or to pay over and deliver
to him discharged of all trusts the whole or any part of
either income or principal to the extent that the trustee
determined that the beneficiary has habits of sobriety, thrift
and economy and the trustee is satisfied as to his ability to
manage and control such property at the time of payment
or distribution.
The trust further provides that after the beneficiary at-
tains the age of 28 years he should receive one-half the net
income and the trustee shall have discretion and power to
make additional payments to him upon the same conditions
as were applicable prior to his attaining that age. The trust
further provides for termination when the husband shall
attain the age of 33 years, with a provision for handling an
ultimate distribution if he should die prior to the termination.
At the time of the decision Charles A. Collins, the bene-
ficiary,- was 22 years old and according to the terms of the
trust, will during the next six years, if he live so long, be
entitled to only so much income or principal as the trustees
in their sole discretion shall see fit to give him. During
that period he cannot compel the trustees to pay any part
of the trust and his creditors, who are in no better position,
cannot reach it.
The complaint showing on its face that by the express
provisions of the trust the defendant Collins would have no
legal right prior to attaining the age of 28 years to compel
payment of any part of the trust funds, and there being no
allegation that he has reached that age, the complaint failed
to state a cause of action with respect to the trustees. Hold-
ing the demurrer should have been sustained, the Court did
not explore the other grounds.
The husband did not appeal from an award of the child's
custody to the mother subject to reasonable visitation by him
or from the portion of the decree impressing upon all income
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to the extent and as security for the payment of any amounts
then due by him for alimony, counsel fees and the support,
medical care and hospitalization of the child. As modified
the case was remanded for further proceedings.
Your reviewer has experienced no little difficulty in an
impartial review of this decision. The child is afflicted, the
acts of physical cruelty by the husband continued into the
eighth month of pregnancy of the wife, whose sole support
for herself and child was from her widowed mother. It is
not surprising to learn that the husband was cited and con-
fined on a contempt proceeding from which there was no
appeal. This is merely one of a long line of decisions by the
Court evincing a constant, growing, continuing willingness
to protect the rights of those who by reason of financial,
physical or other disability are unable to litigate family mat-
ters upon an equal basis.
Legislation
In its 1961 session the General Assembly passed several
acts in the field of Domestic Relations:
Act No. 688 deleted from the statute relating to the renucia-
tion of dower the requirement of an offical seal, and provided
that the absence of a seal in renunciations heretofore or here-
after made shall not invalidate any renunciation of dower.
In its haste to correct its previous error the legislature
eliminated the requirement for the offical seal of out of state
notaries which is in direct conflict with Section 49-53 provid-
ing that commissioners of deeds shall take renunciation of
dowers and certify same under the seal of such commissioner.
It is respectfully submitted that the careful practitioner will
still require the seal of a nonresident commissioner of deeds
or notary.
Act No. 675 amends section 48-51 providing that an ap-
plication for the change of name no longer need be made in
open court,
Act No. 698 amended section 10-2551 of the S. C. Code
(1952) to provide for the payment of a sum not exceeding
$1,000.00 to a minor or other incompetent so as to eliminate
the origin, source or nature of the assets.
[Vol. 15
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Act No. 708 provides that a marriage license may be issued
to an unmarried female and male under the age of 18 years
who could otherwise enter into a marital contract, if the
female be pregnant or has borne a child, under the following
conditions:
(a) The fact of pregnancy or birth must be established by
the report or certificate of at least one duly licensed physician.
(b) She and the putative father must agree to marry. (c)
Written consent to the marriage must be given by one of the
parents of the female or by persons standing in loco patrentis,
or in the event of no such qualified person, with the superin-
tendent of the Department of Public Welfare in the County
in which either party resides. (d) Without regard to the age
of the female and male. (e) Without any further require-
ment for further consent to the marriage of the male.
Act No. 751 amended Act No. 875 of 1960 relating to
the York County Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
so as to change the method of compensation of the Solicitor,
the Clerk of Court; to increase the panel of petit jurors from
20 to 26; and to reduce the original jurisdiction concerning
the welfare of any male child of age 18 to 16.
Act No. 789 amended Section 8-224 of the 1952 Code so as
to provide that loans made to persons for purposes of obtain-
ing higher education shall not be subject to the limitations
imposed by Section 8-221 to 8-223 of the 1952 Code; to
authorize minors to enter into contract for such loans, and
to provide that lending agencies may proceed in civil actions
against minors who obtained loans for higher education. The
effect of this act is to emancipate a minor from the disability
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